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This essay highlights a phenomenon that has no place in the conventional theory of
sophisticated business contracts: the term that makes no sense as an enforceable promise,
one that defies functional explanation, one that drafters blush to rationalize in retrospect
or chalk up to honest mistake. The subset of contract drafters who stop and think about
the term before the contract is signed know that it has little enforcement or other
instrumental value. Even if a court were to enforce such a term, its interpretation would
be extremely hard to predict at signing. Nevertheless, such clauses get included in
contracts between sophisticated parties. Why? The authors speculate that some terms are
in business contracts because the process of formalizing certain feelings about the parties’
relationship in an official and routine manner characteristic of business contracting
provides value to the parties. They suggest that such value is, at least in part, the
satisfaction of expressing their feelings publicly and formally. The authors introduce the
concept of “feel-good formalism” to describe the impulse to express feelings in contract
terms, with limited or no regard for the terms’ instrumental utility.
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Etymologically this is not entirely a nonsense word: super“above,” cali- “beauty,” fragilistic- “delicate”, expiali- “to atone,”
and docious- “educable”, the sum of which equals “atoning for
extreme and delicate beauty [while being] highly educable.”
-Richard Lederer, Crazy English (1989)

I.

Introduction: Supercalifragilisticexpialidocious

This essay highlights a phenomenon that has no place in the conventional theory of
sophisticated business contracts: the term that makes no sense as an enforceable promise,
one that defies functional explanation, one that drafters blush to rationalize in retrospect
or chalk up to honest mistake. In the typology of suboptimal contracting, this nonsense
term is adjacent to but distinct from the wildly ambiguous term, which might reflect
incomplete information, a deliberate agreement to disagree,1 or a commitment to stay out
of court.2 The nonsense term is inserted intentionally, and thus different from a true
oversight. It may be brand new and nonsensical from the start; or it may have lost
meaning over time, yet is deliberately retained in the contract.3 It may occasionally look
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like an illusory promise (“I will if I want to”), traditionally unenforceable in contract law,
yet it is purposefully bargained for by the other side. It is unlike a recital, which may
describe the parties’ motives for entering into the contract but is not generally intended
for direct, functional implementation.4 The nonsense term purports to tell the parties
what to do, but simply does not work, and makes this defect transparent to anyone who
pauses to read it twice, to say nothing of the sophisticated business people whom it
purports to bind.

We speculate that some nonsense terms are in business contracts at least in part because –
like “supercalifragilisticexpialidocious” in Disney’s film version of Mary Poppins – they
make the parties feel good for saying the words. To be sure, such terms usually make
more linguistic sense than the “eighteen consonants and sixteen vowels” in the ditty, yet a
drafter who stops to think about the term before the contract is signed knows full well
that no party would sue on it, no court would enforce it, and it would make little if any
difference in the normative constitution of the parties’ relationship – it would give the
breacher no added pause before breaching.5 Yet one side insists on the term because it
expresses something, something it wishes to say publicly and formally about the
relationship it is about to enter. We call this phenomenon “feel-good formalism” to
denote an anti-instrumental, aesthetic and sentimental attraction to legal form, in which
the primary aim is to make the speaker feel better for deploying the form. Our adoption
of the term “formalism” is admittedly unorthodox; we use it to link our examples both to
the literature on the production of contract documents, and to the debate about judicial
interpretation and drafting incentives.6
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We illustrate what might be feel-good formalism with examples from emerging market
sovereign debt contracts; however, we suspect that the phenomenon occurs throughout
business contracting. Moreover, if it turns out that the feel-good motive drives the
production and use of nonsense terms, it is likely present, albeit less prominent, in the
parts of the contract that make more functional sense.

We begin by describing what we believe to be one of the purest examples of a feel-good
term, the promise never to seek restructuring of a debt instrument, which became
standard in the Brady Bonds issued by poor and middle-income governments beginning
in 1990. These bonds were the last and most successful policy response to the debt crisis
that gripped middle-income and poor countries in Latin America and elsewhere for most
of the 1980s. They also marked a shift from commercial bank loans to capital markets
finance for governments in developing countries, and the start of what became the multitrillion dollar emerging markets bond market.7 Bond contracts in this relatively young
market are the subject of our remaining examples.

After exploring the peculiarities of Brady Bond anti-restructuring terms, we move to the
feel-good aspect of the pari passu clause, an old and sticky term which became a rallying
cry for equal treatment among the creditors of defaulting sovereigns in the late 1990s.
We revisit the controversy surrounding the term using our expressive lens. Finally, we
recount recent changes in sovereign debt documentation that made it virtually impossible
to alter the contractual choice of litigation forum, even as they made it much easier to
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reduce the principal and interest on the underlying debt. Lawyers involved in this
innovation justified the apparent disconnect primarily in expressive terms.

II.

Don’t Even Ask

By 1989, the bankers were tired. Tired of not getting paid, tired of weekend calls from
government officials, tired of hearing echoes of their own footsteps in the stone corridors
of the New York Fed, and more than anything, tired of seeing one another’s long faces
around the endless parade of conference room tables in London, Paris, New York, Manila
and Buenos Aires.

A cascade of sovereign debt crises, beginning with Mexico’s payment suspension in
August 1982, prompted concerted international efforts to preempt outright default using
serial payment reschedulings, “quasi-voluntary”8 injections of new money by old
creditors to service old debts, and all manner of accounting gimmicks to help forestall the
recognition of pervasive debt distress on the queasy balance sheets of the world’s leading
financial institutions. For all the headaches it caused the banks, what came to be known
as the Third World Debt Crisis of the 1980s had dire effects on the borrowers: a “lost
decade” of economic decline and human suffering, an ever-growing debt burden, and a
succession of painful economic reform programs under the auspices of the World Bank
and International Monetary Fund.

After seven years of quietly assuring commercial banks that they would suffer no losses
on their developing country exposure, the U.S. Administration shifted tactics. Nicholas
F. Brady, the new Treasury Secretary, gave a speech in March 1989 in which he stressed
the centrality of “both debt and debt service reduction” — words that had been taboo —
for achieving a durable end to the crisis.9 The speech was not only a turning point in the
8
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crisis, but also in the development of the international financial markets and the
underlying legal infrastructure.

The Brady Bonds were tradable instruments that banks received from their debtors (the
developing country governments) in exchange for writing down their loans.10 Mexico
issued the first batch in 1990. The Brady Bonds catalyzed the revival of international
sovereign bond markets, which had been largely dormant since the defaults of the Great
Depression. The Bradies’ documentation was principally a combination of old loan,
corporate bond, and original contract drafting, but it also reflected the drafting
conventions in a thin smattering of sovereign bonds issued over the decades of market
dormancy. Brady Bond contracts in turn became the template for emerging market
sovereign bonds, a market with an annual trading volume over $6.5 trillion in the mid
2000s.11

Lawyers who participated in the Brady restructurings offered a critical insight into the
underlying contract drafting. At heart, the new bonds were not “market instruments but
rather crisis instruments created specifically by the creditor banks as a prerequisite for
agreeing to significant debt and debt service reduction.”12

By 1989, the bankers were tired – but they were also angry with Brady and his principal
deputy, Treasury Under Secretary David Mulford, for making them take losses when they
had been promised for years that they would not have to. Commercial bank creditors that
agreed to accept the Brady Bonds demanded an ironclad promise that they would never
again be dragged to the same conference rooms over the same countries. The result was
a set of exceptionally strict anti-modification provisions, requiring the consent of every
single bondholder to amend the payment terms of any bond. Also included was, in the
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words of one borrower representative, “the most fatuous thing ever to have been put into
an agreement”:13
[The sovereign] will not, directly or indirectly, seek any restructuring or
rescheduling of the Bonds or any provisions thereof, nor will it, directly or
indirectly, seek or request any loans, advances, extensions of credit or other
financial accommodation from any holders of the Bonds or any affiliate thereof
based upon such holdings.14
Such a formal promise never to seek a debt restructuring was new in the Brady Bonds. It
also made little practical sense. Suppose a sovereign borrower bound by the clause ran
out of funds, or decided to stop paying, and sought to renegotiate. The creditor might
refuse, which would give the debtor the choice between continued performance and
payment default. Under the “don’t even ask” clause excerpted here, the creditor would
also have the right to sue in the absence of payment default.15 Yet no one involved in
negotiating the Brady contracts has suggested that the risk of such a lawsuit could deter a
debtor contemplating default from merely requesting relief. If it existed, such a threat
appears to have had no impact on Ecuador’s 1999 decision to proceed with the first
default and restructuring of the Brady Bonds that were issued just four years earlier.16
13

Interview of Lee C. Buchheit (9 July 2009).
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disfavoured in U.S. contract doctrine. See e.g., Beatty v. Guggenheim Exploration, 122 N.E. 378 (N.Y.
1919) (“Those who make a contract, may unmake it. The clause which forbids a change, may be changed
like any other.”) Unlike the Brady term, which only binds the sovereign, the provision invalidated by
Justice Cardozo in Beatty – a general prohibition of oral modification and waiver – purported to bind both
parties. See e.g., Christine Jolls, “Contracts as Bilateral Commitments: A New Perspective on Contract
Modification” (1997) 26 J. Legal Stud. 203. Explicit formal restrictions on modification are also distinct
from structural and functional barriers that may make modification difficult or practically impossible. The
unanimity requirement for amending payment terms, present in all Brady Bonds, may be characterized as a
combination of formal and functional barrier: unanimous consent is so difficult to attain that its
requirement is tantamount to a formal prohibition on amendment. For a typology of anti-modification
devices, see Anna Gelpern & Adam J. Levitin, “Rewriting Frankenstein Contracts: Workout Prohibitions
in Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities” S. Cal. L. Rev. [forthcoming in 2009].
15
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Why, then, did the creditors insist on, and borrowers accept, such nonsense in their
contracts? The borrowers’ answer seems simple: it would cost them nothing “because it
was so fatuous.”17 Unlike other provisions in business contracts that are not normally
intended to be enforced as written,18 a “don’t even ask” clause would not shame a wouldbe defaulter into paying, or deter a casual inquiry into restructuring terms (assuming such
inquiries are ever made).19 The clause offers no road map, jogs no memory, administers
no truth serum to debtor government functionaries.20 For the serially defaulting
sovereign,21 it seems costless and strongly resembles a textbook illusory promise (“I will
not seek to restructure until I do”).

The creditors’ motives are harder to discern, and potentially more interesting. Some have
suggested that the new term was an attempt at retribution, and a shot across the bow
aimed less at the borrowers, than at the international official sector – rich country
governments and international financial institutions – seen as betraying earlier promises
not to force bankers into debt relief.22 Yet neither the term nor anything else in the
contract purported to bind official actors. Although the officialdom of the day most
likely felt a reputational stake in the outcome, the contract between the debtor and its
creditors was an odd place to express it.

payment terms, the solemn promise never to seek restructuring could be amended by a simple majority of
the bondholders.
17
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20
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In retrospect, government officials privy to the Brady negotiations sound sheepish about
the clause. In the words of one senior official at the U.S. Federal Reserve at the time,
“You bloody lawyers while I was asleep let the Bradies go forward with ‘cross our heart
and hope to die…’ ”23 They suggest that the clause served as symbolic reinforcement of
the Bradies’ status as exit instruments for long-suffering banks, and may have reaffirmed
what was then believed to be a practical reality – that bonds held by a multitude of
atomistic creditors dispersed worldwide could not be restructured, at least not without
causing a global financial cataclysm.

For our purposes, the crucial point is that in over a decade of working in the sovereign
debt community, we have found no one willing to attribute functional significance to the
promise not to seek a restructuring.24 On paper, it was a negative covenant, one of the
most important structural elements of a business contract.25 In practice, it was a symbol,
a marker, a cri de coeur, a plaintive never-again that made it crystal-clear to everyone
how the banks felt about the events leading up to the contract. It was the antithesis of
stale boilerplate, a new provision that was most important in the very context where it
was introduced – as a matter of expression – perhaps more so because it could have little,
no, or highly uncertain practical effect on the behavior of the parties going forward.

III.

Liberté, égalité, fraternité

In the 1988 film A Fish Called Wanda, the lead character makes her lovers jabber in
foreign languages during intimate encounters. Latin phrases occasionally play a similar
role in business contracts.26 In the case we discuss below, the Latin term pari passu,
whose meaning in sovereign debt contracts remains obscure and actively contested after a

23

Interview of former Federal Reserve Board official (7 October 2005) on the condition of anonymity.
Our observation is not based on statistical surveys of the sort that might be used to test the intuition
advanced here; an in-depth empirical study is beyond the scope of this essay.
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More often, they merely blunt the drafter’s already weak inclination to innovate, perhaps because foreignlanguage boilerplate has even greater potential than plain English to hide the wisdom of generations that
came before. See Gulati & Scott, supra note 3.
24
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decade of litigation and academic debate, became a rallying cry and a focal point for
creditor organization.

A typical pari passu clause reads as follows: “All the obligations and liabilities of the
Borrower hereunder rank, and will rank, either pari passu in rank of payment with or
senior to all other unsubordinated Indebtedness of the Borrower.”27 The Latin phrase
means “equally” or “in equal step.” Such a clause has appeared in sovereign debt
instruments since at least the late nineteenth century. It is one of the few terms that has
been continuously included in sovereign debt contracts since before World War II. It
was common in the handful of sovereign bonds issued in the 1960s and 1970s, continued
in the commercial bank loans that ran into trouble in the 1980s, and remained common in
the sovereign bonds of the 1990s and beyond. Yet, it is not clear that the clause ever
made any sense from an enforcement perspective. Commentators have long highlighted
the limited (or non-) utility of the clause in the sovereign setting.28 In domestic corporate
bankruptcy, the notion of being in equal step has meaning because proceeds from
liquidation are distributed among creditors in the order established in advance by statute
and contract.29 Senior creditors go first, subordinated creditors take what is left, and all
those in equal step recover ratably from the liquidation proceeds. But sovereigns cannot
be liquidated. If there is no liquidation event where the assets of the sovereign are
counted up and paid out, it is unclear when, if ever, the clause might be deployed. Yet,
for over a century, the clause has remained a staple of these sovereign contracts, even as
other clauses have come and gone.

27

Lee C. Buchheit, How to Negotiate Eurocurrency Loan Agreements (London: International Financial
Review, 1995) at 76-79.
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29
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A pari passu clause without more is a promise by the debtor not to subordinate the
creditor to others that would, as a result, come ahead of it in an asset distribution. For
most of its history in sovereign debt instruments, the clause has been interpreted as going
to the status or ranking of the debt, but not to the manner in which it will be serviced. A
stock example of a pari passu violation in the sovereign debt writing of the 1980s
involved advance preferential earmarking of government revenues or foreign exchange.30
The prevailing view of sovereign debt practitioners and writers appeared to be that the
universe of such violations was extremely narrow, since earmarking and formal
subordination are virtually unheard of in modern sovereign practice. It was also
commonly thought that a creditor facing discrimination in payment would seek redress
under provisions that go specifically to payment, not to ranking.31 Our interviews for
related projects suggest that a widely held view among sovereign debt cognoscenti in the
mid-1990s was that no one knew quite what the clause meant.32

The consensus, such as it was, came under attack in the fall of 1999, when Ecuador
announced it would default on its Brady Bonds. It made the mistake of trying to go about
default in what must have seemed to Ecuador and its advisors a clever and nuanced way:
it proposed to service uncollateralized Brady Bonds, draw down the collateral on the
bonds secured by zero-coupon U.S. Treasury Bonds, and exempt Eurobonds from
restructuring altogether in a last-ditch effort to preserve a prayer of accessing the capital

30

See e.g., Philip Wood, Law and Practice of International Finance (London: Sweet & Maxwell Ltd.,
1980) at 156; William Tudor John, “Sovereign Risk and Immunity under English Law and Practice” in
Robert S. Rendell ed. International Financial Law:Lending, capital transfers and institutions, vol. 1, 2d ed.
(London: Euromoney Publications, 1983) 79 at 96. See also Brian W. Semkow, “Syndicating and
Rescheduling International Financial Transactions: A Survey of the Legal Issues Encountered by
Commercial Banks” (1984) 18 Int’l Law. 869 at 899 [Semkow]. Semkow makes a subtle but crucial move:
he suggests that “discrimination against lending banks in the payment” of general revenues or foreign
currency, rather than their advance earmarking, would be a pari passu violation in a sovereign loan
contracts.
31
For a survey of literature and arguments on the meaning of the pari passu clause, see Lee C. Buchheit &
Jeremiah S. Pam, “The Pari Passu Clause in Sovereign Debt Instruments,” (2004) 53 Emory L.J. 869; G.
Mitu Gulati & Kenneth N. Klee, “Sovereign Piracy” (2001) 56 Bus. Law. 635 [Gulati & Klee].
32
See e.g. Lee. C. Buchheit, “The pari passu clause sub specie aeternitatis” (1991) 10:12 Int’l. Fin. L. Rev.
11 (“The fact that no one seems quite sure what the clause really means, at least in a loan to a sovereign
borrower, has not stunted its popularity among drafters of loan agreements and debt restructuring
agreements”); Philip R. Wood, Project Finance, Subordinated Debt and State Loans (London: Sweet &
Maxwell Press, 1995) at 165 (“In the state context, the meaning of the clause is uncertain because there is
no hierarchy of payment which is legally enforced under a bankruptcy regime”).
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markets.33 Although giving creditors access to interest collateral was specifically
contemplated in the underlying bond contracts, the bondholders’ response was irate. Led
by hedge fund manager Marc Hélie, they took the unprecedented step of accelerating the
collateralized bond — a move that had been considered way beyond their organizing
capacity – ostensibly to force Ecuador into “pari passu treatment” of its creditors.34
Investors succeeded in forcing all private bonded debt into the restructuring, and Hélie
briefly acquired folk hero status as “The Man Who Broke Ecuador”. However, in the
ensuing negotiations, he and his allies failed to secure a ratable payment profile among
all of Ecuador’s official and private creditors.35

For the purposes of this discussion, the key point is that, no matter what meaning pari
passu may have had when first included in a sovereign debt instrument or what meaning
it may have acquired after a wave of high-profile court battles starting in 2000, by late
1999, only one writer had suggested, and only in passing, that it conferred the right to
ratable payment.36 This view ran counter to that of the leading writers and practitioners
in the field. Yet even though the Latin term probably did not mean what the Hélie and
colleagues were demanding, it captured investor imaginations, and channeled righteous
anger like no other legal or moral theory to condemn Ecuador’s wrongdoing.37
Ecuador’s pari passu moment got almost completely drowned out the following year,
after a Belgian court upheld the ratable payment interpretation of the pari passu clause in
a lawsuit against Peru.38 That lawsuit jolted the sovereign debt establishment, and
became the subject of innumerable articles in the scholarly and trade press, most of which

33

Felix Salmon, “The Buy Side Starts to Bite Back”, Euromoney, (April 2001) 46[Salmon].
“Living with the Dollar: Dollarization has put Ecuador's economy back on track after a disastrous
rollercoaster ride that ended m default. Confidence is back, but the new currency poses new challenges.
(Ecuador dollarization)” Latin Finance (March 2002) SS11 [Living with the Dollar]. ; see also Salmon,
supra note 31; Soma Biwas, “Carrion at Ecuador's Gate” Latin Trade 8:3 (March 2000) 26.
35
Salmon, supra note 32; Living with the Dollar, supra note 32.
36
Semkow, supra note 28.
37
Ironically, the term whereby Ecuador undertook never to seek a Brady Bond restructuring, discussed in
the previous section, played a minor role in the debates surrounding its default.
38
Elliott Assocs, L.P., General Docket No. 2000/QR/92 (Court of Appeals of Brussels, 8 th Chamber, Sept.
26, 2000); see also Elliott Assocs., L.P. v. Banco de la Nacion, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 368 (S.D.N.Y. Jan.
18, 2000) (executed Aug. 31, 2000) and Declaration of Professor Andreas F. Lowenfeld Dated August 31,
2000, at 11-12 (footnote omitted), Elliott Assocs., 2000 WL 1449862 (96 Civ. 7916 (RWS), 96 Civ. 7917
(RWS) (advocating the ratable payment interpretation).
34
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were harshly critical of the court.39 Belgian legislation ultimately foreclosed the
possibility of similar suits. However, copycat arguments proliferated in the United States
and the United Kingdom, and at least in the United States, they have yet to be
authoritatively resolved.40 Four years after Ecuador’s default, a cartoon that
accompanied an article about pari passu in a U.K. trade journal featured the Oracle of
Delphi opining on the meaning of the clause: “Damned if I know!!!”41

Nevertheless, beginning in 2003, pari passu was routinely elevated to the category of
“Reserve Matters” in sovereign debt contracts in New York and London, which meant
that amending the Latin would require the highest possible creditor voting threshold
available under the contract.42 This newfound salience of the term was undoubtedly due
at least in part to its surprising success in the courts. But after the profound interpretive
shock of the Elliott decision in Belgium, observers also expected the parties to clarify the
meaning of the term: merely making an admittedly inartful, litigation-prone clause
harder to amend seemed counterintuitive.43

The nearly forgotten rebellion of Ecuador’s bondholders in the fall of 1999 might suggest
part of an explanation: whatever it might have meant as a legal matter, pari passu had
39

See e.g. Gulati & Klee, supra note 29; see also EMTA Position Regarding the Quest for More Orderly
Sovereign Work-Outs (17 October 2002), online: Emerging Markets Traders Association
<http://www.emta.org/ndevelop/keymsg1.pdf>.
40
For a summary of follow up litigation, see Lee C. Buchheit & Jeremiah Pam, “The Hunt for Pari Passu”
(2004) 23:2 Int’l. Fin. L. Rev. 20 [Buchheit & Pam]. Bill Bratton uses principles of contract interpretation
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acquired unusual rhetorical pull as a symbol of equality and bondholder brotherhood in
the face of sovereign venality.44 This expressive value was quite apart from the term’s
capacity to make the debtor do the right thing, or make a court tell the debtor to do the
right thing. Pari passu was more than a novel legal argument; it was a slogan and an
incantation. To some, amending it might have seemed akin to amending the words
written on a banner that had flown over the barricades.

IV.

Sacred Rights and Profane Payments

Our last example is a set of clauses that look perfectly functional at first blush—so
functional, in fact, that a major trade association proposed them as part of its sovereign
bond documentation template. The peculiarity of these clauses, which struck us and
some of the practitioners with whom we have discussed it, is their radical reversal of the
priorities embedded in standard-form sovereign bond contracts only a few years earlier.
Part of this whiplash effect may be attributable to the expressive motive, or feel-good
formalism.

As noted, emerging-markets sovereign bonds issued in New York between 1990 and
2003 required the consent of each bondholder to amend payment terms. The theories on
the origins and persistence of this unanimity requirement are numerous and still hotly
debated across academic disciplines.45 Part of the impetus behind it in the early 1990s
may have been a desire to make the Brady Bonds and their successors “senior”
instruments, immune from restructuring.46 New York law instruments with unanimity
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provisions dominated emerging markets debt issuance in the 1990s and early 2000s.47
The rest comprised mainly English-law bonds, which could be amended with the consent
of a bondholder majority.48

By the mid-1990s, the official sector had come to see the amendment restrictions as a
threat to financial stability. Like some creditors, officials bought into the view that a
unanimity requirement could effectively block debt renegotiation. Conventional policy
wisdom in 1995—1996 held that more sovereign debt distress was inevitable: that bonds
had quickly become too big to exempt in any meaningful restructuring; and that any
contract term that could block bond restructuring would lead to negotiating stalemate,
protracted court battles and economic decline, worse than anything seen in the 1980s.49

We have detailed elsewhere the complex combination of public and private effort that led
to the shift away from unanimity to qualified majority amendment in New York
sovereign bond practice beginning in 2003.50 Here we highlight a curious development
in London after the New York shift. Since 2003, most English-law sovereign bonds have
retained, but tightened, the majority amendment formula for the payment terms. Many
New York and London contracts also elevated certain non-payment terms, such as pari
passu, to Reserve Matter status on par with the payment terms. But several English-law
contracts went farther: they revived the unanimity requirement and applied it to litigationrelated terms, such as choice of law, choice of forum, submission to jurisdiction, waiver
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of sovereign immunity, and the appointment of an agent for the service of process.51
Thus if three-quarters of all bondholders in a recent issue by the Republic of Georgia
agreed to forgive their debts entirely, they could do so and bind the quarter that wanted to
be paid. However, if the same creditors agreed to let the Republic be sued in New York
rather than London, they would likely run afoul of the unanimity requirement for
litigation-related terms. This special protection of judicial enforcement is also enshrined
in the model clauses promulgated by the leading financial industry association in London,
which served as a template for the few sovereign bonds that have adopted unanimity for
non-financial terms.52

Practitioners have told us that raising the amendment threshold for litigation terms to
100% was meant “to protect minority rights … [so that the] process for a suit is preserved
if the minority believed there had been an anomaly in how the majority went about
exercising collective action.”53 Creditors gave up the heretofore sacrosanct right to be
paid in exchange for an immutable right to sue the sovereign—on a contract whose
economic terms could be eviscerated by a supermajority vote of their colleagues. One
cynical law firm partner who counsels sovereign debtors observed:
If seventy-five percent of the holders can vote to reduce the payment amount, who
cares whether unanimity is required to alter the right to sue. The seventy-five
percent could reduce the payment obligation to zero. What use would the right to
sue be then? This makes no sense.54
This flip from privileging payment terms to privileging litigation terms could have any
number of functional and historical explanations. Maybe it made sense for creditors to
reassess the value of an ironclad payment promise in a world of limited sovereign
resources, no statutory bankruptcy regime to enforce payment priorities, and increasingly
51
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frequent debt exchanges that circumvented unanimity to achieve deep debt relief.55 Yet
the elevation of judicial enforcement terms made less sense. Despite a handful of highprofile settlements and a spike in lawsuits on sovereign bonds (mostly arising out of
Argentina’s $100 billion default in late 2002), litigation-related recoveries from
sovereigns remained minuscule, while the lawsuits’ deterrent effect was undetectable.
Litigation was not much more effective at getting governments to perform in 2008 than it
had been in 1998. But it is the conjunction of the two trends that is hardest to understand:
the right to sue is protected when the substantive cause of action is most likely to be
taken away. Litigation is hard enough where there is a debt to sue on; it is hard to
imagine where the debt has been amended away.56

Other parts of the model clauses proposed by the U.K. industry group may help solve the
riddle of unanimity’s revival. Apart from judicial enforcement terms, the model
recommended requiring unanimous bondholder consent to amend any terms in a debt
exchange in ways that discriminate against the old debt holders.57 Such a provision
would make it impossible for a sovereign to use exit consents to render old bonds illiquid
and unenforceable as part of a debt exchange, much as Ecuador had done in 2000. The
unanimity barrier to the use of exit consents, along with the use of unanimity to freeze
creditors’ right to sue the sovereign, both reacted to Ecuador’s Brady Bond restructuring.
However, the exit consent technique is less important—some say practically irrelevant—
now that bonds issued under New York law have adopted majority-modification
provisions. As a result, we suspect that the motive for elevating litigation terms in this
context was, in significant part, expressive and symbolic. Creditors sought to protect the
right to sue the sovereign above the economic terms, even where lawsuits “have not
55
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yielded one cent on the dollar”58 or discernibly deterred default, to reaffirm the salience
of “creditor rights”, and register continued opposition to obnoxious restructuring tactics.

V.

Conclusions

We have speculated that parties may sometimes include terms in complex business
contracts because they feel better for saying it, even where they know full well that the
term will do little or nothing to advance their cause. This intuition is not part of the
conventional accounts of contracting, although it is consistent with the recent trend to see
contracts as more than instrumental devices that do what they say,59 as well as with
established theories of contracts as vehicles for parties to tell the world about their
relationship.60 If future research bears out our suspicions, it would also cast a different
light on the canons of contract interpretation, which demand that judges either give
functional meaning to a contract clause, or refuse to enforce it as unsupported by a
bargain. We suspect that there are times when parties do not intend for judges to enforce
their contract term as written, even where its structural position – for example, as a
covenant rather than a recital – might suggest that it was supposed to “do something”
rather than just “say something”. Yet such a term is far from illusory; on the contrary, it
may be the product of hard bargaining, knowingly exchanged for the other side’s
substantial promises.

There are many kinds of non-functional clauses and many motives for their inclusion.
We limit our speculation to one—w call it feel-good formalism—where a party derives
value from putting words in its contract to get something off its chest, to say it “out loud”
in the formal contractual setting, without regard for the term’s technical efficacy.
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The three anecdotes in our essay, all of which come from the emerging markets sovereign
debt setting, suggest different ways in which feel-good formalism may be present in
contracting. These range from purely feel-good terms – we suspect these are rare – to
suboptimal terms that may persist in part because the parties find them emotionally
potent, to contract innovation practices that may represent an emotional reaction to an
earlier event in, or even outside, the contracting relationship. In most cases, such terms
and practices will also have functional dimensions, and may have other nonfunctional
ones – as symbols or signals directed at the outside world.61 Our argument, then, is
narrow: it goes to one motive among many for including a term in a complex business
contract.

The pure feel-good motive is not prominent in the contracts literature, although it is
implicated in practices that have periodically received considerable scholarly attention.
This essay flags it in a particular setting, where enforcement is limited by sovereign
immunity and the lack of an international infrastructure for sovereign debt restructuring.
In this setting, precisely because of the enforcement difficulties, it may be relatively easy
to identify nonsense terms.62 Future research might ask whether the phenomenon is
idiosyncratic to the sovereign debt world.

The relationship between a sovereign debtor and its creditors is distinct from private
debtor-creditor relationships that drive the contracts literature, not least because the
borrowing state still enjoys considerable protections under the law of sovereign
immunity. However, the lawyers and contracting routines are the same in sovereign and
large corporate settings. Lawyers go about negotiating and analyzing contracts in
sovereign deals much as they do in other deals; this overlap is evident in the similarities
of contract structure and language. If they find it useful to insert nonsense terms in
sovereign contracts, we suspect these same rationales carry over to other settings.
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